Soft power and its audiences: Tweeting the Olympics from London 2012 to Sochi 2014 by Burchell, Kenzie et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Soft power and its audiences: Tweeting the Olympics
from London 2012 to Sochi 2014
Journal Item
How to cite:
Burchell, Kenzie; O’ Loughlin, Ben; Gillespie, Marie and Nieto McAvoy, Eva (2015). Soft power and its audiences:
Tweeting the Olympics from London 2012 to Sochi 2014. Participations: Journal of Audience & Reception Studies,
12(1) pp. 413–437.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2015 The Authors
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://www.participations.org/Volume%2012/Issue%201/27.pdf
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Page 413 
 
. 
           Volume 12, Issue 1     
        May 2015 
 
 
 
Soft power and its audiences: Tweeting the 
Olympics from London 2012 to Sochi 2014 
 
Kenzie Burchell,  
University of Toronto, Canada 
 
Ben O’Loughlin, 
Royal Holloway, University of London, UK 
  
Marie Gillespie, 
Open University, UK 
 
Eva Nieto McAvoy, 
Birkbeck, University of London, UK 
 
Abstract: 
The ‘Tweeting the Olympics’ project (the subject of this special section of Participations) 
must be understood in the context of efforts by host states, the International Olympic 
Committee (IOC) and other actors involved in the Games to cultivate and communicate a set 
of meanings to audiences about both the Olympics events and the nations taking part. 
Olympic Games are not only sporting competitions; they are also exercises in the 
management of relations between states and publics, at home and overseas, in order to 
augment the attractiveness and influence or the soft power of the states involved. Soft 
power is most successful when it goes unnoticed according to its chief proponent Joseph 
Nye. If so, how can we possibly know whether soft power works? This article reviews the 
state of the field in thinking about public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and soft power in 
the period of this project (2012-14), focusing particularly on how the audiences of soft 
power projects, like the London and Sochi Games, were conceived and addressed. One of 
the key questions this project addresses is whether international broadcasters such as the 
BBCWS and RT used social media during the Games to promote a cosmopolitan dialogue 
with global audiences and/or merely to integrate social media so as to project and shape 
national soft power. We argue first that the contested nature of the Olympic Games calls 
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into question received theories of soft power, public and cultural diplomacy. Second, 
strategic national narratives during the Olympics faced additional challenges, particularly 
due to the tensions between the national and the international character of the Games. 
Third, the new media ecology and shift to a network paradigm further threatens the 
asymmetric power relations of the broadcasting paradigm forcing broadcasters to reassess 
their engagement with what was formerly known as ‘the audience’ and the targets of soft 
power. 
 
Introduction:  who and where are the audiences of soft power, public and 
cultural diplomacy? 
2012-14 was a period in which the UK (London) and Russia (Sochi) sought to create an image 
of their respective Games that would affect public opinion at home and overseas in ways 
that would bring instrumental benefits: legitimacy and popularity for the respective 
governments, and opportunities to increase investment, tourism, student recruitment and 
cultural ties with and from other countries. It was also a period during which questions of 
soft power became central to debates about public diplomacy in the UK, particularly in 
relation to international broadcasting and the end of Foreign Office funding for the BBCWS 
in 2014 (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2014; House of Lords Select 
Committee on Soft Power and the UK’s Influence, 2014). Furthermore, the ‘rise of the rest’ 
and the diffusion of power from state to non-state actors have placed soft power and its 
audiences at the core of foreign policy (Nye 2011:101; House of Lords Select Committee on 
Soft Power and the UK’s Influence 2014).1 In this context, a concept of international 
relations based on attraction and influence rather than command and control came into 
prominence, and the practices of public diplomacy emerged as one of the primary tools 
which governments sought to use in order to generate soft power  (Nye 2011:101). If the 
Olympics presented an opportunity to reinforce political and economic objectives through 
soft power strategies, the narrow pursuit of national agendas appears to stand in tension 
with universalist or cosmopolitan Olympic ideals. And, as this article suggests, previous 
hosts have had similar goals and have sometimes met with dire geopolitical and financial 
consequences.   
 In an expanding but uneven global media ecology, the identity of nation-states is 
projected through public diplomacy tools to create images and narratives of nations among 
domestic and international audiences. Such engagement has the potential to create 
opportunities for political, economic and cultural benefits. In the context of global 
mediatized political performances, the ‘narrative of a nation’, is spelled out through 
representations of shared experiences and ‘sets of stories...historical events, national 
symbols and rituals’ (Hall 1992:293 as cited in Hogan 2003:101). The Opening and Closing 
Ceremonies of each Olympics are replete with, and extensions of, such representations of 
events, symbols and rituals – and a key focus of our project. ‘Statecraft’ has become 
‘stagecraft’ (Kunczik 2003:120 as cited in Rivenburgh 2010:187).Yet these narratives and 
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representations involve not only the discursive construction of the nation, as in Anderson’s 
‘imagined communities’, but also the performance of the entire interacting international 
sphere of nations (Miskimmon et al. 2013; O’Loughlin forthcoming). State-sponsored 
national identities and performances jostle and compete, contradict and contest one 
another in the global media arena. These mediatized performances project national 
narratives about what kind of world order they inhabit: about the values, interests and 
forms of political organisation that bind or divide the community of nations. These 
globalized cultural and political conditions, far from erasing national identities, incite a more 
forceful expression of national identity in an atmosphere of ‘corporate cosmopolitanism’ 
(Gillespie and Webb 2012). And it is in the global political contestation around Olympic 
Games that some states assert sovereignty and self-determination against the encroaching 
influences of powerful rival nations and the global corporate actors amongst them (Hogan 
2003:103); powerful national and corporate interests also respond to those challenges. This 
contest or competition (Price 2015), with the Olympics and IOC at the centre, we argue, calls 
into question received theories of ‘soft power; and ‘public diplomacy’.  
 Nye famously defined soft power as ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the 
outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment’ (Nye 2008:94). 
Soft power ‘co-opts people rather than coerces’, where people include foreign populations 
and governments alike. Soft power arises in a large part through the ‘values ... [a] country 
expresses in its culture’ as well as the ‘moral authority’ in the eyes of foreign and domestic 
policies (Nye 2008:95, 97). Any nation has a degree of soft power without necessarily 
attempting to create it; it is the by-product of what others find appealing about it. Of 
course, the Olympics provide the opportunity for states to deliberately instrumentalise soft 
power resources in order to bring benefits of various kinds. But how do we know how 
audiences respond to soft power projects? 
 Theories of soft power, both those of Nye and of his critics, have paid scant attention 
to audiences or the ‘targets’ of soft power (see Gillespie and Nieto McAvoy 2015 for an 
overview of the main critiques). To be sure, if soft power relies primarily on the attraction it 
exerts on its subjects, is it enough to focus on the resources of agents of soft power and 
their strategies while neglecting its audiences? Arguably, the problem might be not so much 
in trying to define the inner workings of the ‘soft’ but in the shifting meaning of the term 
‘power’. In a context of new media, like Twitter, and the diffusion of power, notions of state 
‘power over’ publics are being rebalanced by ethical discourses of audience empowerment 
(e.g. Berenskoetter 2007:3; Lukes 2007; Leblow 2007; Ringmar 2007; Fisher 2010; Lock 
2010; Fitzpatrick 2014; van Ham 2014). Here, the overseas audiences of soft power are 
viewed not so much as passive subjects but as active agents and legitimate stakeholders 
who play a role in shaping global media events as co-creators of meanings. Audiences might 
actually have something to say about the Games – via global news organisations like the 
BBCWS on their Twitter platforms. Researching the Games through the lens of BBCWS and 
Twitter forces us to analyse the complex relations between public and cultural diplomacy as 
sources and resources, tools and techniques of soft power. It does so in the context of the 
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profound shifts that are taking place in international communications and in relations 
between states and publics. 
 The popularity and ubiquity of the soft power concept has paralleled the 
development of the field of public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is the practice of conducting 
foreign policy by influencing overseas publics (Cull 2008:xv). This includes communicating 
foreign policy goals (Cowan and Cull 2008:6, 7) but also constructing lasting relations and 
dialogue with overseas publics and trying to use these relations to steer overseas publics to 
exert pressure on their governments. Possessing soft power, it is assumed, enables the 
management of engagement with overseas publics. International broadcasting is a good 
example, whereby states fund news organisations in order to influence the global new 
media environment in diverse ways. The degree to which state-funded, international 
broadcasters exercise editorial independence varies hugely between nations, and at 
different historical moments but the Olympics offer perfect opportunity for states and 
broadcasters to collaborate to project a national narrative (Gillespie and Webb 2012).  
 Cultural diplomacy is a state or actor’s demonstration of cultural resources and their 
facilitated transmission to global public or specific foreign publics, for instance through 
education exchanges, art or museum partnerships, or scientific cooperation. The work of 
the British Council, as the UK’s pre-eminent international cultural relations organisation is a 
good example of the cultivation of attitudinal and behavioural dispositions favourable to the 
UK over the long term. Public and cultural diplomacy overlap and should be treated as 
complementary soft power tools. Both are traditionally outward-facing and unidirectional 
activities, rather than reciprocal and mutual engagements between publics and state actors. 
They are funded by the state to attract and influence foreign publics: get ‘them’ to learn 
‘our’ language, like our culture, prefer our news, and so in time become more receptive to 
our values and even our interests.  
 There are several problems that arise from this model, which is ultimately based on 
unsubstantiated and simplistic assumptions about culture, communication and audiences. 
On the one hand, how influence, attraction or passive cultural ‘osmosis’ (Bially Mattern 
2007:118 n.4.) is supposed to happen is not usually addressed by either the theory or the 
practice of soft power (see, e.g. Bially Mattern 2007; Leblow 2007; Vuving 2009; Rothman 
2011 for exceptions). If ‘soft power depends more upon the subject’s role in that 
relationship than hard power does’ and attraction ‘depends upon what is happening in the 
mind of the subject (Nye 2007:169), why are most accounts of soft power still state-centric 
and agent-centric? Alternative models for thinking about influence in the 21st century media 
ecology are required to overcome the problems that practices of soft power often ignore, 
particularly that of how influence and attraction works on overseas publics and whether and 
how it is translated into ‘desirable behaviours’. Here, the concept of ‘strategic narrative’ 
might prove more useful in understanding ‘the formation, projection and diffusion, and 
reception of ideas in the international system’ (Roselle et al. 2014:74).2 Accordingly, thinking 
about soft power in terms of narratives also helps shift the focus to its subjects as it enables 
tracing the reception and interpretation of specific narratives (Roselle et al. 2014). In a post-
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Cold War international system and rapidly changing communications ecology, national 
narratives are faced with new challenges relating to contestation and credibility (Roselle et 
al. 2014:78). As will be argued, strategic national narratives during the Olympics faced 
added challenges, particularly due to the tensions between national narratives and the 
internationalist character of the Games.  
 Second, the new media ecology and emergence of a ‘network paradigm’ further 
threatens the uneven power relations of the broadcasting paradigm and forces states and 
broadcasters to reassess their engagement with what has been termed the ‘former 
audience’ (Gilmore 2004 as quoted in Procter et al. 2015, this issue). With the emergence of 
social media among other factors, the traditional information/broadcasting paradigm is 
being challenged and arguably replaced by a network paradigm that is based around notions 
of reciprocity and mutuality (Fitzpatrick 2011). The immediate consequence of this is the 
questioning of public diplomacy strategies that favour a ‘sender-message-receiver’ 
transmission model of communication, conventionally practiced by international 
broadcasting outlets. In this paradigm, concepts of soft power and public diplomacy are 
often conflated with the notion of nation branding so that they are all considered ‘as 
expressions of the same image problem’ (Pamment 2014:53). Emphasizing the need to 
design tactics that help get ‘the right message’ across, theories and practices often rely on 
communication strategies from the fields of marketing and public relations, which fail to 
consider complex cultural contexts. And we have not even touched on the ethical issues 
involved in the marketing bad foreign policy (Iraq 2003) or seeking behavioural modification 
in publics. For although the discourse of public relations may adumbrate the profoundly 
behaviourist underpinnings of public diplomacy and soft power theory, we must ask what 
would an ethical public diplomacy look like? 
 In contrast, the ‘connective mindshift’ in public diplomacy has favoured strategies 
based on ‘the relational framework’ over the ‘the information framework’ (Zaharna et al. 
2014). Shifting the focus from message content to message exchange, ‘the relational 
framework’ argues for the promotion of dialogue through the participation in, and the 
creation and management of networks (Willis et al. 2015, this issue). If networks have 
always been at the heart of social interactions, new media has proved to be a catalyst in 
changing the way in which information is used in these networks; shifting from broadcasting 
paradigm in which audiences are seen as passive consumers of information, to a 
collaborative one in which users are both receiving and creating knowledge. Similarly, soft 
power as a resource, which needs to be translated in desired behaviours, needs to be 
‘wielded’ in the first instance while it is ‘created’ by the members of the network in the 
second (Zaharna 2009:94). The ‘creation’ of soft power can be seen as a result of the 
dynamics of the network. The formation of a common identity as a ‘knowledge community’ 
based on a shared narrative leads to co-building trust and credibility and, in turn, soft power 
(Zaharna 2009:106-107). A relational framework which favours quality over quantity, 
cooperation over competition, coordination over control, a global constituency (including 
domestic and diasporic publics at home) over segmented audience, and processes over 
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products are essential to respond to the changes in the global communication era and 
hybrid media ecology (Zaharna et al. 2014). Whether the UK’s and Russia’s public diplomacy 
strategies were ultimately favouring relational soft power strategies during London 2012 
and Sochi 2014 (as opposed to mere unidirectional nation branding objectives) is part of 
what this project explores. 
 This shift in public diplomacy belatedly mirrors the ‘active audience’ concept that 
challenges assumptions about the fixed roles of producers and consumers of information as 
conceived by the broadcasting paradigm. In today’s digital media ecology, audiences for 
media events like the Olympics interact with other audiences and media outlets and 
participate in a global public sphere. They can also help to frame the discussion by 
competing (and perhaps collaborating) with traditional knowledge gatekeepers. Whether 
they do or not is an empirical question which the Tweeting the Olympics project addresses. 
The methodological articles in this special section explore the nature of these emergent 
publics and networks and the changing relation between broadcast media and its audiences, 
particularly through the use of social media such as Twitter. The research presented in this 
issue also intersects with the BBCWS’ interest in exploring Twitter as a resource for engaging 
overseas publics in a ‘global conversation’ (Gillespie and Webb 2012). What might seem to 
be a difficulty for broadcasters provides opportunities for researchers to re-think audience 
research methods by focusing on the interactions between ‘old’ and ‘new’ media, the 
mutual challenges, adaptations and attempts at control (Procter et al. 2015, this issue). A 
shift towards a relational model of international communications that is based on forging 
connections across border finds its challenge, as we will see, in the degree of control that 
any given agent of soft power is willing to give up in favour of embracing democratic 
processes in the creation of meaning, particularly relating to national narratives. Whether 
international broadcasters such as the BBCWS and RT used social media during the Games 
to promote a cosmopolitan dialogue with a global audiences and/or merely to integrate 
social media so as to project and shape national narratives is one of the key questions this 
project addresses. 
 Finally, the credibility of cultural diplomacy and international broadcasting, in 
particular international news broadcasting, is threatened by overt diplomatic objectives and 
visible or perceived close ties with the government (Cull 2008a:33-36). International 
broadcasters and cultural diplomacy organisations are often torn between wishing for 
formal independence from their state, performing the appearance of independence, or 
openly accepting the state’s goals and being seen to work in the state’s conception of the 
national interest (Webb 2014; Gillespie and Webb 2012). Two of the UK’s foremost 
institutions of soft power, the British Council and the BBCWS, are seen by the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office as key public diplomacy partners. It is worth noting then that neither 
the British Council nor the BBC see their activities as directly concerned with soft power 
strategies, but rather see soft power as a by-product of their work: 
 
The BBC is not a soft power ‘asset’ to be deployed at will by the Government. 
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However, through providing global public goods, the most trusted objective 
international news services, and content which deepens knowledge and 
understanding, and is inspiring and entertaining, it is able to project positive 
values about the UK around the world, and enables the UK to accrue soft 
power, both geopolitically and economically.  (BBC 2013:140) 
 
This is an important contradiction to bear in mind – one that was only partially resolved by 
the withdrawal of FCO funding for BBCWS in 2014 in favour of license fee funding. It 
remains to be seen whether the UK audiences who, except for insomniacs and intrepid 
travellers, know little about the BBCWS, will appreciate its significance as one of the UK’s 
most important soft power assets. Its future remains very insecure despite its integration 
into BBC domestic.  
 Despite criticism of the concept of soft power that suggests alternatives to think 
about influence and attraction, and about the role of overseas (and domestic) publics as 
stakeholders in foreign policy, Nye’s soft power is still the most popular term of public 
diplomacy strategies. PD scholars often note that even when problematic, soft power is 
nonetheless the ‘best term we have for encapsulating ideas for which there are few good 
terms’ (Pamment 2013:767). In fact, a performative approach to soft power ‘suggest that 
the term is not fixed, but a malleable signifier of political action’ (Hayden 2012:5). The 
significance of soft power ‘lies in the term’s potentiality across contexts as a resource for 
policy argumentation’ (Hayden 2012:5) whereby it is used to justify ‘reallocation of 
resources to policies like public diplomacy, international broadcasting, and strategic 
communication’ (Hayden 2012:7). However, policy makers should be aware that any 
initiative ‘that begins with the objective of designing a “programme to enhance ... soft 
power” will encounter difficulties’ (Rawnsley 2013:778), not least because soft power is 
built over time and through organizations and institutions that generate engagement, 
relationships, credibility and trust (Gillespie and Webb 2013; Rawnsley 2013). As our 
research on London 2012 has concluded, the immediate (and contested) soft power capital 
accumulated by events like the Olympics 2012 and its ‘patriotic cosmopolitan’ narrative 
might only be short-term if there are no further initiatives and investment in institutions 
and non-commercial projects that ‘carry out their activities in ways that people recognise as 
credible and valuable over a long period of time’ (Gillespie and Webb 2013:450).  
 The Olympic Games, and in particular the act of hosting the Olympic Games, involves 
the convergence of cultural diplomacy, international broadcasting, and benign patriotism in 
an assertion of soft power within a multilateral yet competitive community of nations. 
Amongst other performances of national identity, the Olympics stands out for its attraction 
of truly global audiences through a celebratory atmosphere, which offers a vehicle for the 
demonstration of political clout and economic prowess. The Olympics are not simply 
‘events-on-their own...they are not seen as messages but as media’ (Dayan 2010:23).  They 
are used a stage for national performances for engagement with international audiences, 
governments, and markets. The rituals, symbols, and pageantry of the Olympics are ‘firmly 
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grounded in material relations’. This includes, on the one hand, economic development 
ranging from tourism to international investment and, on the other hand, political 
positioning by demonstration of ideological proximity while fostering trade relationships 
(Hogan 2003:102).  
 
Internationalist Rhetoric and the Nation-Branding Objective 
A revitalized aspect of the modern games, the Olympic Truce, offers an entry point into 
understanding the symbolic gestures that characterize much of the Games. The Truce 
highlights the antithetical assertion of nationalism via notions of universal internationalism 
such as those appealed to under the banner of ‘Olympism’. Originally an imperative 
between hostile city states for the ancient games, it presents a corollary between the inter-
nationalism of Olympic competition and the often changing interpretation of progressive 
‘civilization’, employed in part as mechanism for political outcomes within the international 
community (DeLisle 2011:17).  Pierre de Coubertin, whose internationalist vision came to 
define that modern sense of Olympism, did not seek to exclude nationalism but rather co-
opt and sheath it by appealing to a common community of nations (Morgan 1995:81). In this 
manner, the modern Olympics have always been a project of multi-lateral soft political 
power, where a ‘gigantic egalitarianism’ between nations would appeal to the ‘civilized 
world’ fostering a transcendent ‘state without borders and barriers’ (Coubertin 1901 cited in 
Morgan 1995:83). Yet this ‘sincere’ internationalism, as de Coubertin called it, was to draw 
from the world of cross-cultural currents, built from, rather than reducible to, nationalisms 
(Morgan 1995:88).  
 From the outset this universalism has been a vehicle through which political and 
commercial motivations are pursued. Early 20th century ‘evangelical internationalisms’, 
manifest through cultural movements such as the Olympics, Esperanto and the Scouts, were 
vehicles for a ‘transideological crusade’, deepening the cultural currency of purportedly 
apolitical ‘global’ virtues (Hoberman 1995:31, 37).  In the contemporary era, these values 
have shifted to issues such as human rights, the environment, and technological 
modernization, a transformation of the Olympic character that has occurred alongside a 
parallel process of commercialization, often left as an undeclared dimension of the Olympic 
narrative (Roche 2002:168; Roche 2006b). Hoberman argues that in its earlier iteration the 
Olympics moved from being a Euro-centric aristocratic movement, primarily functioning to 
empower networks of wealth beyond the confines of the nation-state, to a political 
sanctuary in the post-war period - ‘unregulated by democratic political process’ - for 
discredited but never the less high-ranking functionaries of conservative and far-right 
national communities (Hoberman 1995:6, 35). In its more recent iteration, many argue, the 
universal values of Olympism have become a Trojan Horse for large-scale transnational 
market capitalism. For example, Morgan points to the ‘casual (non-moral) language of the 
market’ (Morgan 1995:80), which is used to dismiss the fact that no African nation has 
hosted the Olympics as simply apolitical financial reality that is not in contradiction with 
Olympic internationalist ideals. Below we explore how the public diplomacy around Olympic 
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Games involves a tension between open engagement and profit-driven interest.  
 Despite this overarching internationalist narrative, nationalism cannot not be 
extricated from the particularities of hosting the Olympics as a ‘global media event’ (Couldry 
and Hepp 2009). As an event, the Olympics harken back to Dayan and Katz’s original 
formulation of media events: It is both a ‘contest’ between nations and also an opportunity 
for ‘conquest’ by the host-nation (Dayan and Katz 1992). With the convergence of global 
media attention on the Games, the official narratives of sport and contest vie with 
narratives of national prestige, controversy, and geopolitical pressure. Through both its 
political and mediated legacy, the Games have been exploited to articulate and partially 
determine political moments in history: the recognition and rise of Nazi Germany in 1936, 
the affirmation of London’s post war recovery in 1948, the political manoeuvring of the Cold 
War primarily in Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 (Roche 2006a:37). As Cull argues, ‘the 
entire modern Olympic project may be conceptualized as an exercise in public diplomacy’ 
(Cull 2011:119, 123). It is a spectacle for the advancement of diplomatic objectives, branded 
by host nations for domestic and international prestige, while contested, and sometimes 
successfully rerouted, by global actors with alternative perspectives and goals in mind. In 
2008 the BBC’s Director of Olympics Games coverage, Roger Mosey, declared that the 2012 
London Olympics was a chance to bring ‘the UK to the world and the world to the UK’ 
(Mosey 2008). The UK government, as well as the BBC, were compelled to create strategies 
to enact that statement. The 2012 project reported in this special issue constitutes one 
effort to explore whether such a transaction between the UK and the world occurred and 
whether public diplomacy objectives were achieved.  
 The global media attention that converges on host-nations presents divergent 
opportunities and risks. For established powers, hosting the Olympics is a chance to fortify a 
national image of progress, leadership, and stability. However, countries with an existing 
positive image overseas risk tarnishing that. Wide-spread criticism of the ailing 
infrastructure at the Atlanta 1996 Games served as a critique of US economic dominance 
(Miah, García and Zhihui 2008:326). For nations consistently represented within 
international news settings in a negative manner, the Games offers an opportunity. Image 
management can be used to contest false, stereotypical or out-dated national identities 
(Kunczik 2003 as cited in Rivenburgh 2010:190). Did China turn the 2008 Beijing Games into 
an opportunity? Being the host-nation and host-city means engaging with the ‘high-risk 
mechanism’ of the Olympic spotlight:  the Summer Games are often employed as the 
platform to ‘rebrand an entire nation’, and the Winter Games, having only been held in a 
national capital once (Oslo 1952), are conventionally a project of regional and local 
promotion (Cull 2011:121). Sochi 2014 had promised to be an exception to this rule, as the 
media narrative rarely diverted from debating Russia’s re-emergence as a global power.3  
 For emerging powers, as well as emergent and recovering national economies, to 
host the Olympics can mean ‘political rehabilitation’ of a nation or its ‘arrival onto the world 
stage’ (DeLisle 2011:17). Rome 1960, Tokyo 1964, Munich 1972 are examples of displaying 
the post-war societies of the Axis powers and their reconciliation with the global community 
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(Cull 2011:122; Young 2006). This gives the hosts ‘a symbolic affirmation of the country’s 
recovery from political pariah status that had followed odious actions’ (DeLisle 2011:25). 
Though Beijing 2008 can be interpreted as the global mediated consecration of China as a 
great power, it has also been understood as a vehicle for a particular rehabilitation to 
‘supplant images from 1989’, displacing one icon, Tiananmen Square, with a more 
celebratory one of the Games (DeLisle 2011:25). The poignancy of this stems from Beijing’s 
successive bids for the 2000 and then 2008 Summer Games, where human rights concerns 
and the lack of public reconciliation following Tiananmen ostensibly blocked China’s earlier 
bid (DeLisle 2011:23).  
 Russia’s recent Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics is another example of rehabilitation. In 
this instance, the mainstream media narrative implied a once-demoralized successor to the 
USSR seeking a return to the world stage as a great power. Beijing 2008, Sochi 2014, and Rio 
2018, alongside the FIFA world cup (South Africa 2010, Brazil 2014, Russia 2018, Qatar 
2022), represent a shift towards global recognition of these emerging economic powers 
through the platform of sports-oriented global media events (Almeida, Marchi, Wanderley 
and Pike 2013:271, 274). This trend follows on from earlier recognition of the sub-national 
political and economic emergence of Quebec via the Montreal 1976 Games and, more 
closely related to other forms of nation-branding, the economic ‘rebranding of a society in 
transition’ that was the narrative of Seoul 1988 and Barcelona 1992 games (Cull 2011:121, 
122). In this way, the international community gives recognition to certain values and 
identities. We might expect this to trigger broader public debate about this too, which 
highlights the increasingly important role of the subjects of soft power as active audiences 
and legitimate stakeholders in foreign policy. Public diplomacy around each Games by both 
the host nation and IOC would today have to be prepared for open social media debate in 
multiple languages about great power politics and national or sub-national identities.  
 The Games also provide a venue for the alignment of nations as political actors 
rather than only the rebranding of a single actor. The Cold War saw many such alignments 
including a multitude of Olympic boycotts in response to inter-state grievances and 
subsequent demonstrations of inter-state loyalties. The 2002 Salt Lake City Winter Games, 
the first Olympics after the 9/11 attacks, was ‘opportunistically framed’ by much of the 
western media to publicly delineate established powers with emerging partnerships, while 
also affirming outsider status to other nations, in the political alignments of the ‘war on 
terror’ (Atkinson and Young 2005:277).  The can be understood as an act of diplomacy of the 
host nation, yet such diplomacy continued to frame subsequent Summer Games. Atkinson 
and Young argue that the international media contributed to a narrative of Athens 2004 as a 
security concern that co-opted the Games into discourse revolving around the threat of 
terrorism facing all nations (Atkinson and Young 2005:290). Established in Salt Lake City in 
2002, this narrative still persists through to the most recent Games as a necessary 
discussion for any host nation.4  
 After its successful bid to host the Olympic, London 2012 became the Games that 
would celebrate diversity and foster engagement beyond national borders embracing a 
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cosmopolitan discourse (Pope 2014). FCO strategies were aimed not only at priority 
countries but at diasporas in the UK in order to ‘promote British culture and values at home 
and abroad (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011:23).5 As explained by the report: ‘Thanks to the 
city’s diversity, there will be supporters from every Olympic nation. Every athlete will have a 
home crowd’ (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011:18). Whether this cosmopolitan identity 
translated into cosmopolitan practices and global conversation is debatable, as discussed in 
the articles in this issue. Nonetheless, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 
concluded in its report in 2011 that, to unify its focus on youth, sustainability, security and 
trade, the message to be conveyed should be: 
 
the one successfully deployed in the UK’s original Olympics bid, that London is 
an open and welcoming city, and that the UK is a diverse, inclusive and 
friendly country—in a word, that both London and the UK are generous. Such 
a message would help to redress some long-standing misperceptions of the 
UK (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011:3). 
 
If this cosmopolitan identity would be better pursued within the relational framework and 
using dialogical communication strategies – which would foster in turn the co-creation of 
national and transnational narratives – public diplomacy strategies around London 2012 
were often better characterized as nation branding tactics, as they were ultimately more 
concerned with promoting a competitive identity (Pope 2014). While the 2011 report 
acknowledges the need to respond to the changes in the geopolitical context and new 
media ecology, it still emphasizes an approach based on ideas of ‘spreading the message of 
the 2012 Games’, while advocating the use of social media and ‘viral marketing’ (Foreign 
Affairs Committee 2011:20). Ultimately, overseas publics are conceived by the FCO not as 
equal counterparts in a global conversation, but as passive subjects of UK´s soft power and 
public diplomacy, which are in turn described as tools to be deployed during the Olympics in 
order to change perceptions and gain influence ‘to assist in the in the delivery of the FCO’s 
objectives’ (Foreign Affairs Committee 2011:3, 19). 
 
The IOC and Olympic Charter as public diplomacy actor and instrument 
The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is itself an actor in international relations with 
public diplomatic capacities and a degree of soft power. The Games are not only a vehicle 
for nation-states, the Olympics are an international force itself. The IOC is the global 
corporate entity, comprising of an internally elected committee, which holds the rights to 
the Games and is fundamentally responsible for their staging, interpretation of the Olympic 
Charter, and the formulation of rules and regulations (Mastrocola 1995:143-144). Formally, 
the IOC is a non-governmental organization, yet for the following discussion the IOC may be 
better understood as a foreign policy actor, with its own public diplomacy goals, with Games 
as the mechanism and source of its soft power (Cull 2011:119). The IOC and its Olympic 
movement function as a corporate citizen in a global civil society, defining the external 
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management and diplomacy associated with the Olympics. This occurs primarily through the 
management of rights and responsibilities between the ‘corporate [political] actors’ at the 
national, multilateral, and international level alongside international NGOs, as well as the 
commercial transnational and multinational corporations involved in the production of the 
Games (Roche 2002:167, 172). 
 The IOC decides what political values to privilege. Returning to the Olympics Truce, 
once again we can highlight the stark disparity between the Olympic rhetoric and Olympic 
reality. This disparity is fundamental to any investigation of soft power and global media 
events, leaving space for the exploitation of celebratory cultural diplomacy by national and 
commercial actors (Roche 2002:173). In recent years, the prominence of the Truce has been 
developed by the IOC in co-ordination with the United Nations (UN). Despite an often 
unproductive relationship earlier in the post-war period, the UN is positioned, unlike the 
IOC, to actually broker and leverage bids for international calm (Roche 2002:175). This 
partnership, however, extends beyond the Truce and is one of the diplomatic tools that 
contribute to the IOC’s soft power: the very act of determining what is and what is not 
acceptable political use of the Olympics positions the IOC as the arbiter of subsequent 
public diplomacy and debate. This is demonstrated through changes to the Olympic Charter 
and its enforcement amongst other objectives during the host city selection process and 
preparations prior to Games.  
 The UN supports the Olympic Charter as a source of international law, a customary 
authority that is accepted as the ‘best evidence of current international practice’ 
(Mastrocola 1995:147, 148). While the IOC has no sound legal basis to compel government 
actions, the UN has pressured the IOC to use the Olympics as a leveraging platform to 
address human rights issues globally (Mastrocola 1995:147, 148). Through amendments to 
the Olympic Charter and Code of Ethics, both human rights and environmental concerns 
have been added to the notion of Olympism in recent decades (DeLisle 2011:26). The 
former includes notions such as the ‘harmonious development of human kind’ and the 
‘preservation of human dignity’, as well as prohibiting ‘any form of discrimination with 
regard to a country or a person on grounds of race, religion, politics, gender or otherwise is 
incompatible with belonging to the Olympic Movement.’ (International Olympic Committee 
2013:11-12). In the 1990s, environmental issues rose to the foreground, repeated as an 
Olympic theme by host cities through the association of public health, pollution, and 
outdoor sporting events. These Charter elements, and the degree to which they are applied, 
become the topical levers not just for activist pressure but as mechanisms for the IOC and 
other nations to elicit public claims regarding policy development from host nations and 
host-cities.  In the case of Sochi 2014 Winter Games in Russia, the IOC’s interpretation of the 
Olympic Charter prior to the Games and subsequent redevelopment of the Charter 
following Sochi Games provided two decisive moments of public diplomacy in the global 
controversy sparked by Russia’s legislation aimed at LGBT communities (Associated Press 
2014). With this in mind, analysis throughout this special issue has explored how values 
around nationalism, ethnicity and gender have been deliberated among broadcasters and 
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publics, highlighting the importance of both agents and subjects of soft power in the co-
creation of narratives and the shifting nature of their roles.    
 The IOC also uses cultural diplomacy, deriving much of its soft power from control of 
the Olympics as a cultural event. Cultural diplomacy is evident in the process of selecting 
host cities and negotiating benchmarks prior to and during the Olympics and Paralympics.  
In this manner, the IOC promotes, prohibits, and overlooks many national, political, and 
commercial objectives. China’s ‘Ping Pong Diplomacy’ in 1971 is understood as an 
acceptable use of sport for the purpose of ‘international cooperation and harmony’, while 
more clear attempts at promoting national prestige to the detriment of other peoples or to 
the detriment of international cooperation would be prohibited (Mastrocola 1995:155-156). 
The vague associations and ideals of Olympism are to be promoted (Roche 2002:169), yet 
prestige too closely associated with political ideology outside of Olympism is prohibited 
(Mastrocola 1995:156). It is the very determination of acceptable political objectives and 
ideological terrain that provide the IOC with the instruments of a transnational public 
diplomacy actor. In this context, Olympic rhetoric can easily give way to the IOC’s own 
public diplomacy agendas and in particular its role in facilitating the economic agendas of 
host nations and corporate partners.  
 
Controlling the Narrative in the Potemkin Village 
Dayan and Katz insist that ‘live-ness’ is a defining feature of media events. The sports 
venues, Olympic village, and host city become the source of events and of the narratives 
broadcast to global audiences, but intense scrutiny over these spaces is temporary. Though 
international media report on the host nations and cities from the successful Olympic bid 
onwards (if not during the bidding process), it is the presence of international media during 
the Games that provides the foundation for the live transmission and mediated engagement 
that foment conditions for a media event. This fundamental convergence of news media is 
central to Price’s notion of the media event as ‘platform’ (Price 2011) (See Introduction 
chapter). As a product of the national and international political and economic elite, global 
media events are organized with clear commercial and public diplomacy goals in mind.  The 
control of this platform, and the narratives produced through it, are interwoven with those 
goals. Price qualifies, however, that the ownership of the Olympic platforms itself is already 
‘multiple and ambiguous’ as are the specifics of a dominant or accepted narrative (Price 
2011:x).  In light of this issue’s discussion of soft power and public diplomacy, the dominant 
narrative referred to here is that of the host-nation and their global image management.   
 Democratic host states seek to control the narrative and media reporting of the 
Games; Roche reflects on the ‘capacity for a certain degree of authoritarianism’ even when 
officials know multiple audience interpretations make control of meaning impossible (Roche 
2008:287). Given the unpredictability of audience reception, Olympics organizers and host-
nation enforce strict control of processes over which they do have influence (Rivenburgh 
2010:200). This translates into the controlled experience of the media event as it is unfolds 
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to specifically avoid a snowball effect of undesirable narratives or the pre-mediated seizure 
of the event narrative. The presence and proximity of the global media combines with the 
vortex of the commentary across traditional and social media such that ‘intra-media 
sourcing patterns’ allow for narratives to ‘snowball’ towards a sharp, yet often sharply 
skewed, media constructed image or narrative related to the events (Rivenburgh 2010:190). 
Regardless of whether they are factual or exaggerated, images become a political quandary 
for the host nation when they threaten to overturn public diplomacy objectives (Tehranian 
1984:59 as cited in Rivenburgh 2010:190). Dayan describes a more extreme context where 
the narrative is ‘hijacked’, implying an ‘involuntary antagonistic’ derailing of the organizer’s 
and host’s narrative through an often spectacular ‘seizure’ of the media’s attention, and 
therefore the global public’s attention (Dayan 2005 as cited in Price 2011:86). Price extends 
this argument by highlighting the investment and organization of the event platform, which 
if it can be seized, offers an already established forum for the broadcast of alternate political 
agendas. These agendas are multiple and varied, from criticisms of the host-nation policies, 
to human rights and environmental campaigns, to an assortment of particular political 
groups seeking to raise awareness and draw attention to their cause. The Foreign Affairs 
Committee report for the Olympics 2012 concluded that the Games posed ‘potential 
reputational risks as well as opportunities for the UK’ and urged the FCO and its Olympics 
public diplomacy partners to make sure that there was ‘a “rapid response unit” adequately 
resourced and prepared to take swift action to rebut or challenge negative stories appearing 
in the world media’ (2011:6). Despite (or perhaps as a result of) the intention to dominate 
the narrative, London 2012 was not without controversies over security and ‘hard power.’ 
These included, for instance, the failure of local security firm G4S to provide its promised 
services and international media reporting on high-velocity missiles posted on the roof of 
residential homes around the Olympic village in East London (Pope 2014).  
 While Olympic organizers and host nations find ways to curtail and restrict protest, 
and more acutely establish security regimes to stop the violent seizure of the event through 
terrorism and hostage taking, such strategies cannot cross the threshold of physical violence 
and bodily harm, which itself will become a media spectacle (Neilson 2002:19).6 However, 
the very act of trying to control the narrative is a communicative gesture liable to be noticed 
and interpreted by overseas audiences (Holland and Chaban 2011). Soft power is diminished 
when actors try to use it. A basic flaw in many soft power initiatives can be explained by 
incongruences between specific communication strategies and the organisation’s grand 
strategy– for instance, whether they really value foreign publics as legitimate stakeholders 
of foreign policy or not (Zaharna 2009:158-159). Essential to a ‘connective mindshift’ is 
pursuing an ‘integrative’ grand strategy, which will welcome change and the empowerment 
of foreign (and domestic) publics (Zaharna 2009:158-159). Many of the tensions that 
underscore decisions regarding the regulation of the media and the control of the narrative 
stem from the contradictions not only between different concepts of audiences, but 
between discourses and practices.7 If the London 2012 opening ceremony presented a 
nation open, tolerant and able to laugh at itself, the effort to control debate contradicts and 
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therefore undermines that identity and its appeal. If Russia, expected to be more controlling 
in its approach to international communication, were to step back and allow open debate 
about Sochi 2014, this might enhance its soft power to those supporting such values. In 
short, control is as much about how talk proceeds as who says what – a matter of style over 
content – of being seen by others to approach communicating in a certain way.  
 
Regulating the Media Regulates the Narrative 
Nye argues that the intricacies of international public diplomacy in particular and politics in 
general, have become ‘a contest of competitive credibility’ (Nye 2008:95). Overt attempts to 
control media narratives can be counter-productive and, thus, Olympic organizers divide 
and regulate media towards a common agenda without having the ability to impede 
journalists’ autonomy. Olympic organizers rely, however, on the ‘functional dependency’ of 
the media upon the organizer’s technical and logistical support and degrees of site access 
(Kunczik 2003:119 as cited in Rivenburgh 2010:190).   
 The Olympics, among other mega-events such as the FIFA World Cup, often appear 
to operate as a closed media system in their own right (Rowe 2003:8). Attempts at 
controlling this system extend far beyond the well-publicized exclusive broadcasting rights 
of the Olympics within each national region. The IOC uses their definition and redefinition of 
a journalist, their determination of media practitioners’ rights, and the physical channelling 
of journalist activities through the Olympic Zone and host city. Each of these serve as a lever 
for the control for the Olympic media narrative, and analysis of changes to such control can 
illuminate wider technological changes to journalism and the IOC’s race to contain and 
exploit such changes (Miah et al. 2008:320). The exclusive accreditation system, relatively 
stable since the 1980s, has been adapted recently to divide journalist across three tiers of 
access most clearly represented by three separate press centres: the International 
Broadcasting Centre, the Main Press Centre, and the Non-Accredited Media Centre. 
Partnering broadcast companies, as IOC funding partners and a primary vehicle for creating 
a sense of ‘live’ global spectatorship, are considered not just journalists but ‘Olympic rights 
holders’ with Olympic studio spaces and ring-side access (Miah et al. 2008:326). They 
represent the top tier of IOC accredited journalists. The Olympic pricing structure allows for 
extra cameras and commentary stations at the venues for additional sponsorship payments 
(Rivenburgh 2010:197). As paying partners and sponsors, these journalists appear wholly co-
opted towards the success of the celebratory narrative, akin to embedded reporters with 
military accreditation in conflict zones. The second tier are the non-broadcasting partners 
who are nonetheless IOC accredited journalists without Olympic broadcasting rights who 
are allowed use the Main Press Centre as primary point of access to the day’s events, with 
rights to work from within the Olympic site.   
 Beyond these two tiers is an added third tier for the swathe of what the IOC deems 
non-accredited journalists, made up of underfunded journalists, bloggers, and others who 
do not have the financial and/or institutional backing to gain accreditation. This includes 
professional journalists who are working without the IOC-licensed access and entitlements, 
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but are nevertheless present and covering the games. They are not allowed to enter official 
venues in a journalistic capacity. This category also includes those who ‘self-characterize as 
journalists [and]…through blogs and similar devices, may have a greater impact on public 
understanding of what the Olympics mean and why’ (Miah et al. 2008:321). Such changes 
offer a proliferation of platforms through which the IOC can promote the Olympic brand, 
but these journalist and bloggers also represent a challenge to the controlled media system. 
The IOC’s comprehensive control over Olympic coverage, so clearly manifest in 
broadcasting, is potentially undermined by ‘unpredictable online environments’ and the 
new forms of journalism and information-sharing native to such spaces (Hutchins and 
Mikosza 2010:281). Rivenburgh notes that the financial limitations on this large group of 
journalists mean that they are less able to engage with the actual event, and in some cases 
less able to stray from the media centre and experience the city as they report constantly to 
remote production teams at home covering the Olympics (Rivenburgh 2010:197). This 
further contributes to the intra-media sourcing as well as the reliance upon and often-
unchecked magnification of social media discussions and perspectives. 
 During the first six days of the Atlanta 1996 Games the computer systems journalists 
depended upon to meet deadlines were not fully operational and transmitted unreliable 
information (Rivenburgh 2010:194). Meanwhile, non-IOC accredited journalists were left 
underserved and unmanaged by the IOC, without at that time a press centre of their own. 
Non-accredited journalists criticised the lack of preparation and the crumbling infrastructure 
in Atlanta. At the 2000 Sydney Games these journalists’ presence and potential influence 
were recognized; they were given a Non-Accredited Media Centre (NAMC), which 
complimented the accredited Main Press Centre and International Broadcasting Centre. 
Such accommodation represents a management of the journalists and their subsequent 
narrative by the IOC, as ‘the immediate, lived experience of journalists’ finds its way into 
news media narratives as stand-in for the host-culture and their preparedness (Rivenburgh 
2010:194).  
 By the Torino 2006 Winter Olympics, the NAMC focused on accommodating the 
swell of online journalists alongside the appearance of video bloggers and others using new 
online video sharing services such as YouTube as low cost production platforms (Miah et al. 
2008:321, 326). In parallel, official broadcasters such as NBC had embraced online streaming 
of their exclusive Games coverage, such that the Internet became a source of officially-
endorsed live coverage. At the Beijing 2008 Games, the proliferation of mobile media 
prompted organizers to promote a form of mobile coverage and video sharing by athletes, 
spectators, and self-styled citizen-journalists through short recordings on popular video chat 
phone apps (Hutchins and Mikosza 2010:279). Whether it is tiers of accreditation, physical 
media centres, platforms for online sharing, or the strict policies about athletes’ social 
media use discussed earlier, the facilitation of users’ ability to create content and 
communicate within the Olympic venues represents a strategy for controlling the Olympic 
narrative.  
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When Public Diplomacy clashes with Domestic Politics 
Inextricable from these projects of national rebranding is the impact on the host-nation’s 
domestic citizenry and the government’s relationship to them. Given the lengths hosts will 
go to secure a coherent and positive image of a successful Games, there are a variety of 
possible outcomes in relation to domestic and regional populations that over time may 
undermine the nation-branding exercise. The Berlin 1936 Games are the most salient 
example, while other Olympics point to the complexities between domestic power 
management and global standing.  
 DeLisle examines the possible outcomes for the Beijing 2008 games, where the ‘most 
audible’ strand of the Olympic narrative stressed nationalism alongside ‘domestic prosperity 
and order’ and, of course, the obligatory appeals to international cooperation that is 
Olympism (DeLisle 2011:31). With the nominal success of the games on the global stage, the 
regime’s increased confidence could lay the foundation for starkly divergent outcomes 
domestically. On the one hand, the increased openness towards scrutiny could be met with 
a greater congeniality towards international norms. On the other hand, the domestic power 
structure could be emboldened by the success of heavy-handed political repression and 
forced relocations, while nevertheless remaining aware of the benefits of superficially 
appearing to embrace international concerns (DeLisle 2011:52). The fortunes of Russia’s 
Sochi 2014 Games, interrupted by unrest in Ukraine and the international community’s 
disavowal of Russia’s annexation of Crimea, is another example, focused upon in this issue, 
where success in global diplomacy can have unexpected ramifications for domestic and 
regional politics.    
 The Mexico 1968 Games offers an example of the risks taken by an emerging nation 
in hosting the Olympics. The Games became a spectacle of political embarrassment abroad 
and a historical watershed leaving the domestic population with memories of 
authoritarianism and repression (Zolov 2004:9). Mexico sought to present itself globally as 
politically tolerant, harmonious and modern, exploiting its unique position that spanned the 
ideological fault lines of Cold War alliances. Yet the expenditure of building this ‘New 
Mexico’ sparked nation-wide protests that successfully appropriated Olympic imagery and 
arguably the wider Olympic platform, showcasing the state’s subsequent violent repression 
of the movement to those watching around the world (Zolov 2004:29). The Games 
diminished the state’s credibility on the global stage, left the domestic population divided, 
and a generation distrustful of the government. Arguably, however, there was a positive 
legacy of the 1968 Games. Mexico was the first host to combine a ‘Cultural Olympiad’ with 
the sporting events. With over 1,500 events, a third of which were located outside the host 
city, the Cultural Olympiad would introduce the vital role of showcasing the cultural 
offerings of host city as well as the country, fostering the notion of Olympic legacy beyond 
the Olympic infrastructure, while simultaneously enfranchising a wider swathe of 
intellectuals, artists, and cultural practitioners into the building of the Olympic narrative 
(Zolov 2004:169, 183). Both represent important mechanisms of domestic governing and 
global public diplomacy.   
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 As Tomlinson succinctly states, a bid to host the Olympic Games has increased 
focused on ‘Not impact, not effects, not outcomes, but legacy’ (Tomlinson 2013:138). The 
delicate international political climate from 1968 through to the 1980 Games necessitated 
that the host focused on the urgent issues of the day such as human rights, terrorism, long-
term debt and political boycotts, and it was not until the mid-1980s that the concept of 
domestic legacy emerged within the minutes of the IOC meetings (Tomlinson 2013).    
 This is now part of branding and selling the host city. In 1999, concepts of 
sustainable development and legacy were introduced to the Olympic Charter, which 
interjected a new managerial rationality to the Olympics. Leveraging the benefits of the 
Olympics shifted towards a deeper marketization and commoditization of the sports media 
complex in the host city, which developed into a new repertoire of soft power tools for the 
IOC and governments alongside corporate sponsors (Tomlinson 2013:143). The architecture 
of the Olympic village has long been thought of as a primary legacy while also acting as the 
idyllic representation that the host nation and city hopes to project internationally (Muñoz 
2006:175). The construction of venues and athlete accommodations offers a material 
representation of national development and/or leadership by highlighting technological and 
cultural accomplishments of these buildings. Earlier legacy projects had highlighted 
representations of Taylorism and Fordism in progressive urban infrastructures. This shifted 
to notions of urban regeneration, through to the current vogue where state branding meets 
urban marketing (Muñoz 2006:184). This was most recently manifest by the Adidas 
sponsored ‘adiZones’ public exercises areas, which were set up across London as both a 
regeneration project but also corporatisation of public space (Weber-Newth 2014) 
 The legacy and impact of the Games for the host-city focuses nearly wholly on 
economic development. Host-cities profit and position themselves within a wider global 
market economy through the Olympics, and even arguably through the media spotlight of 
the bidding process itself (Oliver 2011). Tourism and the local events industry are the 
clearest beneficiaries of the Olympic spotlight. The cities gains ‘landmark venues’ 
showcased across global media. However, the promises of increased local employment and 
sustained economic gains, in some cases to justify the displacement disadvantaged 
residents and migrant workers, are often temporary, if fulfilled at all (Tomlinson 2013:145). 
In 2012, UK public diplomacy projected a national identity based more upon economic 
competitiveness than cosmopolitan connections; any cosmopolitan imagery was of a 
branded kind, promoting the UK as cosmopolitan rather than enacting cosmopolitan 
communication (Pope 2014). This hints at contradictions arising not only from different 
communication strategies but conflicting conceptions of the roles of audiences. Whether 
this competitiveness was achieved is perhaps moot.8 The public diplomacy task during 
London 2012 is was ultimately to control journalist coverage of the event at the time and 
then perform success afterwards.  
 
Conclusions 
In this special section, the Olympic Games acted as a prism for our investigation into the 
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changing spaces of audience engagement through public and cultural diplomacy and 
international broadcasting at a time when each is adapting to a rapidly changing digital 
environment.  The Games offered a chance to reconsider the role of soft power across 
contemporary global media cultures, where political action and diplomacy can no longer be 
untangled from their mediated enactment and execution.  
 Above all, this article makes clear why the Olympic Games is useful for analysing 
tensions central in social science: between nationalism, universalism and patriotic forms of 
cosmopolitanism; between instrumentalism and nation branding on the one hand versus 
the intrinsic joy of sport and solidarity on the other; between host states’ desire for control 
of media and public narratives of the Games versus the spontaneity and chaotic dynamics of 
social media and a multilingual, multiplatform media ecology; between satisfying the 
preferences and expectations of the host’s domestic public versus pleasing international 
publics who may have different interests, values and expectations; between espousing 
tolerance and diversity versus an event based on competition and therefore the likelihood 
of antagonism and even conflict; between the theory and practice of public diplomacy 
within the context of the ‘connective mindshift’ that has not only changed the focus from 
the agents to the subjects, but has ultimately reconceived the concept of audiences as co-
creators of soft power, bringing a challenge to public diplomacy strategies, international 
broadcasters and audience research methodologies.  
 In the article we showed how the approach taken by UK and Russia governments 
often (and inevitably) meant falling on one side of each of these trade-offs. Consequently, 
the way the host country sets up the platform for the Games inevitably steers the Games’ 
meaning in a certain direction. Ultimately, the meanings of particular instances of Olympic 
Games rest with audiences at home and overseas, and their interpretations and subsequent 
behaviour. How those meanings are formed is the main subject of the other research 
articles in this special section.  
Intrinsic to these trade-offs are questions of identity, hierarchy and solidarity. For 
this reason, in this special issue many of the analysis articles explore dimensions of these 
questions. The project team decided to pursue this by focusing on how issues of 
nationalism, religion and gender were debated in social media spaces and television 
coverage and across both. We also addressed questions of control of the Olympics agenda 
by measuring how social networks and media content form, are sustained, and decay 
(Fisher/Willis, Aslan et al). In this way and through these analyses, the special issue makes 
an original and multi-faceted contribution to our understanding of how public diplomacy, 
cultural diplomacy and soft power function around global media events such as 
contemporary Olympic Games.  
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Notes: 
                                                          
1 Although Nye has developed the term ‘smart power’ to ‘counter the misperception that soft power 
alone can produce effective foreign policy’ (Nye 2004; Nye 2010; Nye 2011:22). 
2 Although Nye uses the concept of ‘narrative’, by focusing on soft power he fails to develop a 
framework to capture the processes that shape and are shaped by narratives and its components 
(Roselle et all 2014:75).  
3 London 2012 was also perceived at risk of being an exception, as an increase in London’s 
reputation as a ‘world city’ might not have necessarily benefited the whole of the UK (Foreign Affairs 
Committee 2011:30). 
4 These media narratives are not without consequences.  Security measures ballooned at the Salt 
Lake City 2002 Games, amounting to approximately 25% of the budget at US$310Million (Atkinson 
and Young 2005:276). Boykoff and Fussey examine this darker side of the Olympic legacy, namely 
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the justification and development of a ‘sizeable security infrastructure’ that can be employed to 
deter terrorism but also suppress activism and even ‘low-level incivilities’, in place of the promised 
urban, social and economic renewal (Boykoff and Fussey 2013:254). In this manner, the political 
management and control of media event space itself is a legacy written into the city. 
5 The FAC was ‘supplied in confidence with the FCO’s list of priority countries’, which was not 
reported (FCO 2011:19). 
6 In fact, the Foreign Affairs Committee report stressed that ‘We welcome the unequivocal assurance 
by the Government that the long-standing rights of free expression and freedom to protest 
peacefully in the UK will not be suspended because of the Olympic Games. We recommend that the 
Government, both in the run-up to the Games and during the Games themselves, should firmly 
resist any pressure that may be applied by certain foreign governments to curtail the rights of 
freedom of expression and freedom to protest peacefully in the UK’ (Foreign Affairs Committee 
2011:24).  
7 The same tension can be traced in the House of Lords Select Committee on Soft Power and the 
UK’s Influence report which stresses the importance of engaging with a global ‘hyper-connected’ 
audience, but ultimately advocates for one-way communication strategies in order to wield soft 
power (Gillespie and Nieto McAvoy forthcoming).  
8 One only needs to refer to the House of Lords 2014 report on soft power to see the varied 
interpretations of the impact of the Olympics. 
